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Counterpoint*
This is the sixth time that the Genocide Convention has been reportedfavorably by the Committee on Foreign Relations. On each prior oc-
casion the Committee has urged the Senate to give its advice and consent
to ratification along with three understandings and one declaration. Last
September, after a three-year Administration review of the Convention,
President Reagan announced that he would "vigorously support" ratifi-
cation of the Genocide Convention. Representatives of the Departments
of State and Justice urged the Senate to "finally provide its advice and
consent to U.S. ratification" and testified that the package of three under-
standings and one declaration was sufficient to address all the legal ques-
tions that has been raised concerning ratification.
This year the Administration has done an about-face on the Geno-
cide Convention. Six months after testifying in opposition to any limita-
tion on U.S. acceptance of the World Court's jurisdiction, the State
Department strongly supported an article IX reservation and left open
the question of whether it would continue to support ratification in the
absence of such a reservation. The change in position was attributed to
the Court's decision in the case brought by Nicaragua against the United
States for alleged violations of international law. The Administration
also cited a "political judgment" that the Senate would not give its advice
and consent to the Genocide Convention without an article IX
reservation.
Subsequently Chairman Lugan and Senator Helms proposed a pack-
age of eight separate conditions, including the article IX reservation sup-
ported by the Administration. In offering the package, Chairman Lugar
informed the Committee that he would not request floor time or support
Senate approval of the Convention without these eight provisions.
On May 21, 1985 the Committee unanimously approved four
Lugar-Helms conditions that are similar or identical to the provisions
previously recommended by the Committee and the Administration.
The full package of eight conditions proposed by Senators Lugar and
Helms was narrowly adopted by a vote of 9-8. An amendment offered by
Senator Dodd to modify the effect of the article IX reservation was de-
feated by a vote of 8-9. The Committee then voted 10-0 with seven Sena-
tors voting present to report the Convention favorably to the Senate
* For the reader's interest, the Journal has reproduced Additional Views of Senators Pell, Biden,
Sarbanes, Cranston, Mathias, Dodd, Eagleton, and Kerry ifi SEN. COMM. ON FOR. RELS., GENOCIDE
CONVENTION, S. REP. No. 2, 99th Cong. 1st. Sess. 28-33 (1985).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
subject to the Lugar-Helms package of two reservations, five understand-
ings, and one declaration.
We believe the Committee has made a mistake in adopting condi-
tions that would seriously compromise our ratification of the Genocide
Convention. While several provisions in the new package merely restate
understandings recommended by the Committee in 1970, 1971, 1973,
1976, and 1984, the package as a whole taints the political and moral
prestige that the United States would otherwise gain by ratification of
this landmark in international law. The reservations dealing with article
IX and the U.S. Constitution are epecially unwise from the standpoint of
policy and precedent, and they completely remove the practicial advan-
tages in the advancement of human rights that will be gained by ratifica-
tion without crippling reservations. We will press vigorously for the
deletion of these two reservations when the Genocide Convention is con-
sidered by the full Senate.
ARTICLE IX: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The significance of the Genocide Convention lies in the fact that it
forms part of a network of treaties which declare certain actions to be
international crimes, justifying concerted action by the world community
to bring the perpetrators to trail. A practical benefit of ratification would
be the opportunity for the United States to advance its human rights
policies by invoking article IX of the Convention to bring charges against
foreign governments who fail to uphold their responsibility to prevent
and punish instances of genocide. If the United States itself reserves au-
thority under article IX, our ratification of the Convention becomes a
purely symbolic gesture lacking the substance which would enable us to
use the Convention as a valuable weapon for the advancement of human
rights throughout the world.
If we adopt an article IX reservation, the international law doctrine
of reciprocity would enable another country to assert our reservation
against us, effectively blocking the United States from ever bringing
charges in the World Court against countries that have failed to punish
instances of genocide. (Conversely, the fact that nineteen nations, nearly
all Communist-bloc countries, have themselves adopted article IX reser-
vations would enable the U.S. to invoke these reservations as a check
against baseless charges in the Court).
The proponents of an article IX reservation contend that without
such a reservation the United States would be subject to trivial or base-
less charges before the World Court. In fact there is nothing to prevent
such charges from being brought before the World Court by any nation
regardless of whether the court had jurisdiction and regardless of the
merits of the charge. In response to a question submitted by Senator Pell
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at the March 5 hearing the Administration stated that "there is nothing
to prevent unfriendly nations which have accepted the compulsory juris-
diction of the World Court from attempting to bring trivial or frivolous
charges in the Court." An article IX reservation is not a safeguard
against baseless propaganda.
For the United States to reserve authority under article IX suggests
that we are seriously concerned about the validity of charges which un-
friendly nations might attempt to assert in the World Court. Instead of
defensively embracing a shield that to date has largely been adopted only
by countries that may well have reason to fear charges of genocide, the
United States should take the initiative in identifying the perpetrators of
genocide and bringing them to account under international law.
Finally, if we proceed to ratify the Genocide Convention with an
article IX reservation, we can anticipate that some of our closest allies
will condemn our action and may even refuse to recognize our ratifica-
tion. A U.S. reservation to article IX would be circulated to all nations
that have previously ratified the Genocide Convention. If any nation
wished to object, it would be entitled to do so; the legal effect of the
objection depends upon the statement of the objecting party. For exam-
ple, the Netherlands has objected to article IX reservations as "incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention."
Moreover, the Netherlands has taken the position that it does not deem
any state making such a reservation to be a party to the Convention. The
United Kingdom has similarly stated that a reservation to article IX "is
not the king of reservation which intending parties to the Convention
have the right to make." Australia, Belgium, Brazil, and Ecuador have
also formally objected to article IX reservations.
Only nine months ago the Adminstration testified before the Com-
mittee and made these same arguments in opposing an article IX reserva-
tion offered at that time by Senator Helms. Davis R. Robinson, then
Legal Advisor to the State Department, noted that the United States is a
party to more than eighty multilateral and bilateral treaties and other
international agreements with dispute resolution clauses similar to article
IX of the Genocide Convention. No concerns were raised by the Admin-
istration last September about the International Court of Justice, despite
the fact that the Nicaragua case-later cited as the major reason for the
reversal on article IX-had been before the Court for several months and
a preliminary decision on the question of jurisdiction had been issued in
May, 1984 (the preliminary decision rejected the U.S. arguments on ju-
risdiction and largely conformed with the final decision issued last
November).
We reject the notion that the Court's decision in the Nicaragua case,
or any other individual case for that matter, should form the basis for the
United States to follow the lead of Communist-bloc nations in deciding
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when we will agree to participate in ICJ proceedings. As a nation com-
mitted to the rule of the law and to the advancement of human rights, we
have no need to erect artificial barriers against baseless propaganda
charges. In opposing the proposed article IX reservation at the March 5
hearing, John C. Shephard, the President of the American Bar Associa-
tion, urged the Committee to "join our allies in rejecting such a reserva-
tion as a flimsy crutch for a totalitarian regime." We concur with this
view and will urge the Senate to delete the article IX reservation when
the Genocide Convention is brought to the floor.
U.S. CONSTITUTION
As reported by the Committee, the resolution of ratification is fur-
ther undermined by a reservation asserting that "nothing in the Conven-
tion requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United
States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as
interpreted by the United States."
The Genocide Convention has been the subject of thirty-six years of
detailed legal analysis by numerous authorities. We do not believe there
is any credible contention that the Genocide Convention is in conflict, or
could be in conflict, with the U.S. Constitition. The Supreme Court, in
its own words, "has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy
of the Constitution over a treaty," Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, (1957). In
1970, then Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist testified
that "there are no constitutional obstacles to U.S. ratification of the
treaty." The rights of American citizens, he stated, would be fully pro-
tected under the Convention "because the Constitution is superior to a
treaty no matter how interpreted." This position was fully reaffirmed by
the Reagan Administration at hearings held by the Committee on For-
eign Relations in September, 1984 and March, 1985.
The purpose of a state in asserting a reservation is to establish the
limits of the obligations that are accepted by the reserving state in the
treaty contract. The reservation adopted by the Committee in effect says
that we ratify the Genocide Convention only insofar as we find no viola-
tion of our Constitution in the future. This kind of self-judging reserva-
tion is inconsistent with the rationale behind the international law
doctrine that a state, once having ratified a treaty, may not invoke provi-
sions in its Constitution or domestic law as an excuse for failure to per-
form its duties under the treaty contract. The lack of certitude as to our
treaty obligation that is suggested by the reservation is contrary to treaty
practice as well as disturbing to our allies who have undertaken an un-
qualified acceptance of the treaty's obligations.
Equally dangerous is the precedent this reservation creates regard-
ing the treaty obligations of other states. The adoption of this kind of
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self-judging reservation, particularly by other nations that can easily
change their constitutions, would create major problems for the United
States in enforcing treaty obligations that where it is very much in our
interest to hold these nations to their treaty commitments.
This reservation, like the reservation to article IX, will seriously
compromise the political and moral prestige the United States can other-
wise attain in the world community by unqualified ratification of the Ge-
nocide Convention. It will hand our adversaries a propaganda tool to
use against the United States and invite other nations to attach similar
self-judging reservations that could be used to undermine treaty commit-
ments. For these reasons we urge our colleagues in the Senate to delete
this reservation from the resolution of ratification.
OTHER PROVISIONS
Of the remaining provisions in the package, three are essentially
identical to those previously recommended by the Committee: the un-
derstandings regarding "intent" and "mental harm" and the declaration
concerning implementing legislation. The Committee previously has rec-
ommended an understanding regarding the right of a state to bring to
trial before its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed
outside the state. To this provision the Committee has added new lan-
guage stating that the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a
state's laws and treaties (article VII of the Convention) extends only to
"acts which would be criminal under the laws of both the requesting and
the requested state." This language is modeled on the principle of dual
criminality as stated in extradition treaties recently concluded by the
United States. Of course, the Genocide Convention, once ratified by the
U.S., would not by itself require the extradition of any of our citizens.
Once implementing legislation defining and punishing the crime of geno-
cide is enacted, existing extradition treaties not patterned on the standard
of dual criminality would have to be specifically amended to encompass
the crime of genocide. While superfluous, we do not regard this under-
standing as harmful to current extradition practice.
A new understanding has been added stating that "acts in the course
of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent required by arti-
cle II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this Conven-
tion." Since it is obvious that any act committed without the specific
intent required by article II is not sufficient to constitute genocide, a
question arises as to what the United States is really seeking to accom-
plish by attaching this understanding. The language suggests that the
United States fears it has something to hide. Moreover, the relatively
imprecise definition "armed conflicts" in international law is an invita-
tion to problems and will almost certainly draw adverse comments from
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other nations trying to figure out what the language is intended to do. To
call attention to our fears about being brought to account for acts com-
mitted in armed conflicts is really an embarrassment to the United States
and should have no place in our ratification of the Genocide Convention.
Another new understanding states that "with regard to the reference
to an international penal tribunal in article VI of the Convention, the
United States declares that it reserves the right to effect its participation
in any such tribunal by a treaty entered into specifically for that purpose
with the advice and consent of the Senate." The idea of an international
penal tribunal is truly a "dead letter" and had not received serious con-
sideration by the United Nations in over thirty years because of the obvi-
ous problems of sovereignty and due process inherent in such a proposal.
Moreover, it has always been the Committee's belief as well as the view
of successive Administrations that in the unlikely event that a penal tri-
bunal is established, a separate treaty would be required before the
United States could accept its jurisdiction. Finally, it is very unclear
whether this provision would have any legally binding effect on the ac-
tion of future Presidents and Congresses. In our view it has no more
binding authority than a "sense of the Senate" resolution.
CONCLUSION
Last October, faced with the prospect of a filibuster in the waning
hours of the 98th Congress, the Senate, by a vote of 87-2, passed S. Res.
478, expressing support for the principles contained in the Genocide
Convention and declaring its intention to act expeditiously in the first
session of the 99th Congress. Consistent with that resolution, we believe
the full Senate should be given the opportunity at the earliest possible
time to give its advice and consent to the Genocide Convention. Prompt
U.S. ratification, especially in this fortieth anniversary year of the libera-
tion of the Nazi death camps, will enormously enhance the Convention's
value as an instrument to fight human rights abuses around the world.
That value should not be tarnished by reservations which compromise
the meaning and obligations inherent in the Genocide Convention.
We urge our colleagues to ensure that the United States lends its
undiluted support to the legal and moral authority of the Convention by
rejecting the conditions adopted by the Committee on Foreign Relations
and replacing them with the three understandings and one declaration
that have been previously recommended by the Committee. These provi-
sions are sufficient to clarify our Constitutional concerns and, unlike the
conditions adopted by the Committee, are in harmony with the legal and
moral treaty obligation that has been undertaken by our allies through-
out the world.
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